Approved For Release 2008/12/29 : CIA-RDP86M00886R000600100002-6

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date 10-3-84

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. C/CRES		4 Oct
2. DDI		4 Oct
3. DCI		
4.		
5.		

	Action		File		Note and Return
	Approval		For Clearance		Per Conversation
	As Requested		For Correction		Prepare Reply
	Circulate		For Your Information		See Me
	Comment		Investigate	X	Signature
	Coordination		Justify		

REMARKS

Attached is the draft response from the DCI to Johnny Foster and Sey Weiss concerning the study proposals they offered following the deception conference. We drafted this response based on your 21 September memo (Reference attached).

DCI EXEC REG

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)

Chief, FICG

Room No.—Bldg. 3E47 Hqs.

Phone No.

25X1

25X1

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

Approved For Release 2008/12/29 : CIA-RDP86M00886R000600100002-6

Approved For Release 2008/12/29 : CIA-RDP86M00886R000600100002-6

TOP SECRET

25X1

21 September 1984

25 SEP 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : PFIAB Recommendations on Soviet
25X1 Deception

1. The 4 September Foster/Weiss memo to you (Attachment 1) makes recommendations for Community actions on possible Soviet deception which surfaced at the Airlie Conference. These recommendations are consistent with the views they expressed at the conference. (Attachment 2 is our summary of their general
25X1 concerns and their other recommendations made at Airlie.)

2. FICG has a comprehensive memo in preparation which explores a whole range of follow-up implications of the conference. Thus, I prefer a somewhat measured response to PFIAB until we've had a chance to more fully digest the whole package of conference implications. Any Foster/Weiss recommendations ought to be considered as part--albeit an important part--of our
25X1 more broad-based approach to these deception issues.

3. As a preliminary response, however, I think their three basic recommendations all have merit, and deserve our consideration for follow-up studies. Let me take each in
25X1 turn.

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
DERIVED FROM SISR VOL II

Approved For Release 2008/12/29 : CIA-RDP86M00886R000600100002-6

Approved For Release 2008/12/29 : CIA-RDP86M00886R000600100002-6

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 SUBJECT: PFIAB Recommendations on Soviet Deception [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

5. Deception in arms control talks is an important issue and a potentially lucrative research area. As defined in the Foster/Weiss memo, however, it appears too generalized to be practicable. Since it would be a major labor-intensive project, we should begin with a much clearer picture of what to look for. Perhaps Foster and Weiss can better focus their concerns by helping us formulate some testable hypotheses against which we can compare the written record. Then we will be in a better
25X1 position to judge whether such a project would be worthwhile. [redacted]
25X1 [redacted]

6. Such a study would be complementary to, and should be done in conjunction with, a related study requested by Ken Adelman to review the arms control record for knowledge gained about Soviet forces. While these should be separate undertakings, it makes sense to have the deception analysts closely attuned to intelligence we might have gained solely from
25X1 arms control negotiations. [redacted]

7. Soviet disinformation in the public arena emerged as one of the major issues discussed at the conference. Your 10 September talking points for PFIAB, which you may not have had time to review, did address our concerns here (Attachment 3, page 3, last paragraph,), and we envision a concerted response to this problem. In part, this is less of a problem than they suggest owing to the State-chaired Active Measures Working Group which has been very active in this arena. This interagency effort was

The answer is not much. Gained. I will recommending against doing this very expensive & unproductive (we already know the answer) RG

25X1 -2-

25X1 [redacted]

Approved For Release 2008/12/29 : CIA-RDP86M00886R000600100002-6

Approved For Release 2008/12/29 : CIA-RDP86M00886R000600100002-6

25X1 [redacted]

SUBJECT: PFIAB Recommendations on Soviet Deception

set up to keep the USG abreast of Soviet active measures, and to help State better respond to them in a timely and coordinated fashion. DO represents CIA at their bi-weekly meetings, and
25X1 FICG, OGI, and SOVA also attend. [redacted]
25X1 [redacted]
25X1 [redacted] But the problem we should address is how to better focus the intelligence analysis effort (as distinct from diplomatic or C.A. countermeasures) against Soviet influence operations--to include, but not be limited to, active measures--against Western and US targets. Of course this is broader than a "deception" problem (at least as defined by many inside the Community), and I am, with FICG, now exploring ways to improve our management of this
25X1 issue. [redacted]

8. If you agree, we will prepare your response to PFIAB
25X1 along these lines. [redacted]

Robert M. Gates

Attachments:

1 - PFIAB Memo to DCI, 4 Sept 84
25X1 2 - FICG Memo to [redacted] 11 Sept 84
3 - DCI Talking Points for PFIAB 10 Sept 84

25X1

25X1 [redacted]

Approved For Release 2008/12/29 : CIA-RDP86M00886R000600100002-6

Approved For Release 2008/12/29 : CIA-RDP86M00886R000600100002-6

25X1 [redacted]

SUBJECT: PFIAB Recommendations on Soviet Deception

Distribution
1 - Addressee (w/att)
2 - DDCI (w/att)
3 - EX DIR (w/att)
4 - DDO (w/att)
5 - EX REGISTRY (w/att)
6 - NIO/SP (w/att)
7 - NIO/FDIA (w/att)
8 - C/ACIS (w/att)
9 - CRES Chrono (w/o att)
10 - FICG Chrono (w/o att)
11 - FICG Subject (w/att)

25X1 DDI/CRES/FICG: [redacted] (21 September 1984)

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

Approved For Release 2008/12/29 : CIA-RDP86M00886R000600100002-6